Road Pricing
Congestion Pricing, Value Pricing, Toll Roads and HOT Lanes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Victoria Transport Policy Institute
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Updated
22 July 2008
This chapter describes
various types of road pricing, which charge motorists directly for driving on a
particular roadway or in a particular area. “Congestion pricing” (also called
“value pricing”) refers to variable tolls, with higher prices under
congested conditions and lower prices under less congested conditions, intended
to reduce peak-period traffic volumes to optimal levels. “Toll roads” and “toll
lanes” are roadway facilities financed by tolls. “High Occupant Toll (HOT)
lanes” are High Occupant Vehicle (HOV) lanes that also allow use by
low-occupant vehicles that pay a toll.
Road Pricing means that motorists pay directly for driving on a particular roadway or in a particular area. Value Pricing is a marketing term which emphasizes that road pricing can directly benefit motorists through reduced congestion or improved roadways. Managed Lanes is a general term for various roadway management strategies, including HOV, HOT, and congestion priced lanes.
Economists have long advocated Road Pricing as an efficient and equitable way to Finance Roads other Transportation Programs, and encourage more efficient transportation. Road Pricing has two general objectives: revenue generation and congestion management. They differ in several ways, as compared in the table below.
Table 1 Comparing Road Pricing Objectives (Market Principles)
|
Revenue Generation |
Congestion Management |
|
·
Generates
funds. ·
Rates set to
maximize revenues or recover specific costs. ·
Revenue often
dedicated to roadway projects. ·
Shifts to other
routes and modes not desired (because this reduces revenues). |
·
Reduces
peak-period vehicle traffic. ·
Is a TDM
strategy. ·
Revenue not
dedicated to roadway projects. ·
Requires
variable rates (higher during congested periods). ·
Travel shifts
to other modes and times considered desirable. |
Different types of Road Pricing are described below.
Tolls are a common way to fund highway and bridge improvements. Such tolls are a fee-for-service, with revenues dedicated to roadway project costs. This is considered more equitable and economically efficient than other roadway improvement funding options which cause non-users to help pay for improvements (Metschies, 2001). Tolling is often proposed in conjunction with road privatization (i.e., highways built by private companies and funded by tolls). Tolls are often structured to maximize revenues and success is measured in terms of project cost recovery. Tolling authorities may discourage development of alternative routes or modes.
Congestion Pricing (also called Value Pricing) refers to variable road tolls (higher prices under congested conditions and lower prices at less congested times and locations) intended to reduce peak-period traffic volumes to optimal levels. Tolls can vary based on a fixed schedule, or they can be dynamic, meaning that rates change depending on the level of congestion that exists at a particular time. It can be implemented when road tolls are implemented to raise revenue, or on existing roadways as a demand management strategy to avoid the need to add capacity. Some highways have a combination of unpriced lanes and Value Priced lanes, allowing motorists to choose between driving in congestion and paying a toll for an uncongested trip. This is a type off Responsive Pricing, meaning that it is intended to change consumption patterns (Vickrey, 1994).
Cordon tolls are fees paid by motorists to drive in a particular area, usually a city center. Some cordon tolls only apply during peak periods, such as weekdays. This can be done by simply requiring vehicles driven within the area to display a pass, or by tolling at each entrance to the area.
High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes are High
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes that also allow use by a limited number of low
occupancy vehicles if they pay a toll (Stockton and Daniels, 2000;
Distance-Based Charges such as mileage fees can be used to fund roadways or reduce traffic impacts, including congestion, pollution and accident risk. A proposal by the UK Commission for Integrated Transport (CFIT, 2002) proposes that existing vehicle registration fees and fuel taxes be replaced by a variable road user charge using GPS-based Pricing Methods, as a way to reduce traffic congestion and more equitably reflect the roadway costs imposed by each vehicle. Pay-As-You-Drive Vehicle Insurance, prorates premiums by mileage so vehicle insurance becomes a variable cost, which gives motorists an incentive to reduce traffic impacts, but provides no additional revenue.
A variation of road pricing is to ration peak period vehicle-trips or vehicle-miles using a revenue-neutral credit-based system. For example, each resident in a region could receive credits for 100 peak-period vehicle-miles each or $20 worth of congestion fees each month (Viegas, 2001; Kockelman and Kalmanje, 2004; Kalmanje and Kockelman, 2004). Residents can use the credits themselves, or trade or sell them to somebody else. The result is a form of congestion pricing in which the benefits are captured by residents rather than road owners or governments.
Table 2 summarizes these different categories of road pricing and their objectives. Some provide revenues, some reduce peak-period congestion, some reduce total traffic impacts (congestion, pollution, accident risks, road and parking facility costs, etc.), and some help achieve a combination of objectives.
Table 2 Road Pricing Categories
|
Name |
Description |
Objectives |
|
Road toll (fixed rates) |
A fixed fee for driving on
a particular road. |
To raise revenues. |
|
Congestion pricing
(time-variable) |
A fee that
is higher under congested conditions than uncongested conditions, intended to
shift some vehicle traffic to other routes, times and modes. |
To raise revenues and
reduce traffic congestion. |
|
Cordon fees |
Fees charged for driving in
a particular area. |
To reduce congestion in
major urban centers. |
|
HOT lanes |
A high-occupant-vehicle
lane that accommodates a limited number of lower-occupant vehicles for a fee. |
To favor HOVs compared with
a general-purpose lane, and to raise revenues compared with an HOV lane. |
|
Distance-based fees |
A vehicle
use fee based on how many miles a vehicle is driven. |
To raise revenues and
reduce various traffic problems. |
|
Pay-As-You-Drive
insurance |
Prorates premiums by
mileage so vehicle insurance becomes a variable cost. |
To reduce various traffic
problems, particularly accidents. |
|
Road space rationing |
Revenue-neutral credits
used to ration peak-period roadway capacity. |
To reduce congestion on
major roadways or urban centers. |
This table summarizes the major categories of road pricing.
Road pricing impacts vary depending on various factors, including the type of pricing, how it is structured, and the transportation and geographic conditions in which it is implemented. For example, a fixed road toll may do little to reduce congestion if alternative routes and modes are poor, but it may provide significant congestion reductions if transportation alternatives (such as ridesharing, transit and telecommuting) are relatively attractive, and so a modest fee will cause a relatively large mode shift. In some situations, pricing will shift traffic and congestion problems to other routes or areas. Table 3 summarizes the benefits of various pricing strategies. Actual impacts will vary depending on circumstances. For example, in some situations HOT lanes will have greater congestion reduction impacts than others. The point is that these differences should be considered when evaluating and selecting pricing options.
Table 3 Road Pricing Benefits
Strategy
|
Revenue Generation |
Congestion Reduction |
Pollution Reductions |
Increased Safety |
|
Road toll (fixed rates) |
3 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
|
Congestion pricing
(time-variable) |
2 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
|
HOT lanes |
1 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
|
Cordon fees |
2 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
|
Distance-based fees |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
|
Pay-As-You-Drive insurance |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
|
Road Space Rationing |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
Rating from 3 (very beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Road Pricing is usually implemented by public or private
highway agencies or local authorities as part of transportation project funding
packages, for transportation demand management, or through privatization of
highway construction and operations. Implementation may require approval of
other levels of government (for example,
Road Pricing can be implemented at various scales:
·
Point:
Pricing a particular point in the road network, such as a bridge or a tunnel.
·
Facility: Pricing a roadway section.
·
Corridor: Pricing all roadways in a corridor.
·
Cordon: Pricing all roads in an area, such as a central business district.
·
Regional: Pricing roadways at regional centers or throughout a region.
Table 4 illustrates the appropriate scale of various pricing strategies.
Table 4 Appropriate Scale of Pricing Strategies
Strategy
|
Spot |
Facility |
Corridor |
Cordon |
Regional |
|
Toll Roads (fixed rates) |
X |
X |
X |
|
|
|
Congestion Pricing
(time-variable) |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
|
HOT lanes |
X |
X |
|
|
|
|
Cordon Fees |
|
|
X |
X |
|
|
Distance-Based Fees |
|
|
|
|
X |
A variety of Pricing Methods can be used to collect fees, as summarized in Table 5. Newer electronic pricing systems tend to have lower costs, greater user convenience, and more price adjustability, making Road Pricing more feasible.
Table 5 Summary of Fee Collection Options (Pricing
Methods)
|
Type |
Description |
Equipment
Costs |
Operating
Costs |
User
Inconvenience |
Price
Adjustability |
|
Pass |
Motorists must purchase a
pass to enter a cordoned area. |
Low |
Low |
Medium |
Poor to medium. |
|
Toll Booths |
Motorists stop and pay at a
booth. |
High |
High |
High |
Medium to high. |
|
Electronic Tolling |
An electronic system bills
users as they pass a point in the road system. |
High |
Medium |
Low |
High |
|
Optical Vehicle Recognition |
An optical system bills
users as they pass a point in the road system. |
High |
Medium |
Low |
High |
|
GPS |
GPS is used to track
vehicle location. Data are automatically transmitted to a central computer
that bills users. |
High |
Medium |
Low |
High |
This table summarizes various pricing methods. Newer methods tend to have lower costs, greater convenience and price adjustability, making them more cost effective and politically acceptable.
Road pricing should be implemented in conjunction with improved transportation options, so consumers have viable alternatives. For example, congestion pricing can be implemented with Transit and Rideshare and Flextime improvements so motorists have more ways to avoid driving on the priced road. This reduces user inconvenience, reduces the fee needed to achieve a given reduction in vehicle traffic, and increases its effectiveness at reducing traffic congestion.
|
“I’ll
tell you how to solve |
The travel impacts of Road Pricing depend on the type and magnitude of fees, where it is applied, what alternative routes and modes are available, and what is assumed to be the alternative or Base Case (TDM Evaluation).
· Pricing roads that would
otherwise be free can shift vehicle travel to unpriced routes, alternative
modes and closer destinations, and reduce vehicle trip frequency.
· Congestion Pricing (i.e.,
higher rates during peak periods) can cause vehicle trips to shift from peak to
off-peak periods.
· If Road Pricing is used to
fund roadway capacity expansion that would not otherwise occur, it may increase
total vehicle travel (Rebound Effect).
· Road Pricing reduces total
vehicle travel if used to fund roadway capacity expansion that would otherwise
be unpriced (funded through other taxes).
· The better the travel
alternatives (transit, ridesharing and cycling), the more Road Pricing will
cause mode shifts.
The travel impact of HOT lanes depends on the price structure used. If the price is too low, the facility will experience congestion, reducing the performance for both single-occupant vehicle users and HOV users, resulting in reduced transit and ridesharing. It is therefore important for the sake of overall transportation system efficiency that HOT facilities be managed to favor HOV performance.
Several studies have investigated the sensitivity of vehicle travel to road tolls (Transport Elasticities). These indicate a price elasticity of –0.1 to –0.4 for urban highways (i.e., a 10% increase in toll rates reduces vehicle use by 1-4%), although this can vary depending on the type of toll, type of traveler and other factors (TCRP, 2003). Mekky (1999) finds that traffic volumes and trip lengths decline significantly if tolls exceed 10¢ per vehicle kilometer (Canadian dollars). A state-preference survey of suburban automobile long-distance commuters indicates that financial incentives are the most effective strategy for reducing automobile trips. A US$3.00 per round-trip road toll is predicted to reduce automobile commuting by 25% (Washbrook, 2002). One study estimates that congestion pricing can reduce up to 5.7% of VMT and up to 4.2% of vehicle trips in a region (Apogee, 1994).
Table
6 Estimated Fee To Reduce
Vehicle Trips 10%
(May and Milne, 2000)
|
Type of Road Pricing |
Fee Required to Reduce Trips 10% |
|
Cordon (pence per crossing) |
45 |
|
Distance (pence per kilometer) |
20 |
|
Time (pence per minute) |
11 |
|
Congestion (pence per minute delay) |
200 |
Road pricing impacts and benefits depend on the price
structure. Ubbels and Verhoef (2006) predict
that road pricing in The Netherlands would reduce car trips by 6% to 15%. A
flat kilometre fee primarily affects social trips and tends to cause total
trips to decline and shifts to nonmotorized modes. A peak-period fee primarily
affects commute trips, and tends to cause a combination of shifts in time and
mode, and working at home. May and Milne (2000) used an urban traffic model to
compare the impacts of cordon tolls, distance pricing, time pricing and
congestion pricing. They found significant differences in the effectiveness
that particular size fee would have in achieving TDM objectives. Table 6 shows
the estimated price level required to achieve a 10% reduction in regional
vehicle trips. They conclude that time-based pricing provides the greatest
overall benefits, followed by distance-based pricing, congestion pricing and
cordon pricing.
Table 7 Impacts of Congestion Pricing, Year
2010 (Harvey and
Deakin, 1997, Table B.6)
|
Region |
Avg. Fee |
VMT |
Trips |
Delay |
Fuel |
ROG |
Revenue |
|
Bay Area |
13¢ |
-2.8% |
-2.7% |
-27.0% |
-8.3% |
-6.9% |
$2,274 |
|
|
8¢ |
-1.5% |
-1.4% |
-16.5% |
-4.8% |
-3.9% |
$443 |
|
|
9¢ |
-1.7% |
-1.6% |
-18.5% |
-5.4% |
-4.2% |
$896 |
|
|
19¢ |
-3.3% |
-3.1% |
-32.0% |
-9.6% |
-8.1% |
$7,343 |
Avg. Fee = average congestion
fee per mile applied to vehicle travel on congested roads. VMT = change in
total vehicle mileage. Trips = change in total vehicle trips. Delay = change in
congestion delay. Fuel = change in fuel consumption. ROG = a criteria air
pollutant. Revenue = annual revenue in millions of 1996 U.S. dollars. See
report for additional notes and data.
A small reduction in urban-peak traffic volumes can provide
a large reduction in congestion delays. Deakin and Harvey (1997) model the
effect of congestion pricing on transportation impacts in four major urban
regions in
Table 8 Travel Impact Summary
|
Travel Impact |
Toll Road Funding |
Congestion Pricing |
Comments |
|
Reduces total traffic. |
1 |
2 |
Impacts on total travel
depend on the price structure and the quality of alternatives. |
|
Reduces peak period
traffic. |
2 |
3 |
Fixed tolls cause moderate
peak reductions. |
|
Shifts peak to off-peak
periods. |
0 |
3 |
Fixed tolls provide no
incentive to shift. |
|
Shifts automobile travel to
alternative modes. |
2 |
3 |
Congestion pricing supports
use of travel alternatives, toll roads do not. |
|
Improves access, reduces
the need for travel. |
-1 |
0 |
Additional roadway capacity
can encourage low-density urban expansion. |
|
Increased ridesharing. |
2 |
3 |
Encourages ridesharing and
may fund rideshare programs. |
|
Increased public transit. |
2 |
3 |
Encourages transit use and
may fund transit improvements. |
|
Increased cycling. |
1 |
2 |
Encourages cycling and may
fund cycling improvements. |
|
Increased walking. |
1 |
2 |
Encourages walking and may
fund pedestrian improvements. |
|
Increased Telework. |
1 |
2 |
Encourages telework. |
|
Reduced freight traffic. |
1 |
1 |
May have some effect. |
Rating from 3 (very
beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Road Pricing benefits and costs vary depending on travel impacts, what is assumed to be the alternative, and other factors (Pricing Evaluation).
Congestion Pricing is a particularly effective Congestion Reduction strategy. Many economists consider urban traffic congestion virtually unsolvable without some sort of congestion pricing (Goodwin, 1997). Shifting vehicle traffic to other routes or time provides few other benefits, causes spillover impacts (increased traffic on other roads), and may increase crash costs (Shefer and Rietvald, 1997).
Road Pricing that reduces total vehicle travel can reduce
road and parking facility costs, increase road safety, protect the environment,
encourage more efficient land use, and improve community Livability.
The central
Road Pricing that funds additional highway capacity can increase total automobile travel (Rebound Effects), and so may increase downstream traffic congestion, parking costs, crashes, pollution, and sprawl. Expanding highway size and traffic volumes tends to reduce the livability of communities that it cuts through (Levine and Garb, 2000). Ragazzi (2006) argues that highway privatization can result in fragmented planning and inefficient pricing.
Value Pricing and HOT lanes can increase Transportation Options. On unpriced roads, travelers have no alternative to being delayed by congestion. Value Pricing and HOT lanes allow travelers to choose between driving in congestion, avoiding congestion by ridesharing, or avoiding congestion by paying a toll. This lets individual consumers choose the option that best meets their needs for a particular trip. It also tends to improve transportation choice indirectly by increasing demand for ridesharing and transit services (Kain, 1994).
Road Pricing increases motorists’ direct costs, but these are economic transfers; payments by motorists are offset by revenues to the tolling agency or government (Evaluating Pricing). Overall consumer impacts from Road Pricing depend on how revenues are used. If returned as rebates or reductions in other taxes, or used in other ways that consumers value, consumers may be no worse of financially.
Resource costs are primarily the transaction costs of collecting fees, including costs to highway agencies and to users. Toll collection costs range from about 10% of total tolling revenue for electronic toll collection, up to 40% for tollbooths. Toll collection that requires motorists to stop at booths causes motorists delays and increases energy consumption and air pollution. New electronic tolling can reduce these transaction costs (Pricing Methods).
Table 9 Benefit Summary – Toll Funded Roads
|
Objective |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Congestion Reduction |
3 |
Increases road capacity and
reduces demand. |
|
Road & Parking Savings |
-2 |
Increases total vehicle
travel and facility costs. |
|
Consumer Savings |
-1 |
Increases direct consumer
costs, but reduces indirect road costs. |
|
Transport Choice |
1 |
Increases motorists’ choice
if untolled roads are also available or if pricing improves travel
alternatives. |
|
Road Safety |
-1 |
Induced travel and higher
traffic speeds can increase crash costs. |
|
Environmental Protection |
-1 |
Induced travel increases
emissions. |
|
Efficient Land Use |
-1 |
Induced travel can increase
sprawl. |
|
Community Livability |
-1 |
New urban highways may have
negative impacts. |
Rating from 3 (very
beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Table 10 Benefit Summary – Congestion Pricing
|
Objectives |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Congestion Reduction |
3 |
Increases road capacity and
reduces peak-period demand. |
|
Road & Parking Savings |
3 |
Reduces total vehicle
travel and avoids the need to add capacity. |
|
Consumer Savings |
-1 |
Increases consumer direct
costs, but overall impacts depend on how revenues are used. |
|
Transport Choice |
3 |
Increases motorists’ choice
and improves travel alternatives. |
|
Road Safety |
2 |
Reduced vehicle travel
reduces crashes. |
|
Environmental Protection |
2 |
Reduced vehicle travel
reduces emissions. |
|
Efficient Land Use |
2 |
Reduced vehicle travel
reduces sprawl. |
|
Community Livability |
2 |
Reduced vehicle travel
increases community livability. |
Rating from 3 (very
beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Road Pricing has a variety of equity impacts (Pricing Evaluation). It tends to increase horizontal equity by charging users for the roadway costs they impose, and reducing cross subsidies among motorists (from those who don’t drive during peak periods to those who do).
Some critics argue that Road Pricing represents “double
taxation” since motorists pay road user fees such as fuel taxes and vehicle
registration fees. However, existing road user charges in
Road Pricing can impose a financial burden on motorists dependent on that roadway. This impact generally declines over time as consumers adjust to new prices, and can be minimized if Road Pricing implementation is predictable and gradual. For example, if it became public policy that all new suburban highway capacity expansion projects will be paid through user tolls, people could take that into account when considering whether to purchase a home that would require frequent highway trips.
Road tolls represent a greater financial burden on lower-income motorists than on higher-income motorists, but they are not necessarily more regressive than other road funding options, such as fuel taxes or general taxes. Whether a toll is regressive overall depends on how much lower-income consumers drive on such highways, the quality of travel alternatives, and how revenues are used (Giuliano, 1994; Litman, 1996). If Affordability is a major concern, Road Pricing programs can include discounts or a certain number of free passes provided to lower-income households. There is a long history of incorporating vertical equity objectives into transportation policies (i.e., insuring that lower income people have Basic Access). Adam Smith, one of the founders of modern economics, wrote that, “When the toll upon carriages of luxury coaches, post chaises, &c. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight than upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, wagons, and the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.” (Smith, 1776, chapter 5).
Rajé (2003) examines the equity impacts of road pricing and workplace parking levies with focus groups of vulnerable groups (low income, elderly, disabled, urban residents) and travel survey analysis. The results indicate that automobile pricing impacts depend on how revenues are used, how prices are structured and priced areas are defined; and the quality of travel options available, and that citizen support for road pricing increases if they feel that these equity concerns are addressed.
Even lower-income motorists are sometimes willing to pay for time savings, indicating that pricing strategies that prioritize trips can provide a transportation choice that is valued by motorists of all income levels. For example, user surveys of the SR 91 Value Priced lanes, in which motorist can pay a premium to drive on a less congested lane, show that about a quarter of the lowest-income class of motorist (less than $25,000 annual income) use the lanes on a frequent basis (Sullivan, 1998). Paying such a toll may be worthwhile to allow a working parent to avoid fines at their childcare center or to reach an urgent appointment (Giuliano, 1994). Even if a particular motorist seldom uses such an option, its existence may be highly valued, just as ship passengers value having lifeboats that they have will never actually be used (Evaluating Transportation Diversity).
Road Pricing can also benefit transportation-disadvantaged people by reducing the subsidies they pay toward highways and by increasing their travel choices (Kain, 1994). King, Manville and Shoup (2007) recommend that road pricing revenues be returned to cities on a per capita basis as compensation for environmental impacts that vehicle traffic imposes on local residents, and as a way to increase vertical equity. HOT lanes in particular can provide equity benefits by improving mobility options for transit and rideshare users (Levine and Garb, 2000). Congestion pricing and HOT facilities can improve basic mobility by giving priority to high value trips.
Table 11 Equity Summary – Toll Funded Roads
|
Criteria |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Treats everybody equally. |
-1 |
Mixed. Impacts some people
more than others. |
|
Individuals bear the costs
they impose. |
3 |
Yes. Charges users directly
for their road costs. |
|
Progressive with respect to
income. |
-1 |
Regressive, but not
necessarily more regressive than other funding options. Depends on travel
alternatives. |
|
Benefits transportation
disadvantaged. |
1 |
May improve travel
alternatives. |
|
Improves basic mobility. |
2 |
Improves access by
automobile and other modes. |
Rating from 3 (very
beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Table 12 Equity Summary – Congestion Pricing
|
Criteria |
Rating |
Comments |
|
Treats everybody equally. |
-1 |
Mixed. Impacts some people
more than others. |
|
Individuals bear the costs
they impose. |
3 |
Yes. Internalizes congestion
externalities. |
|
Progressive with respect to
income. |
0 |
Mixed. Depends on travel
choices and how revenues are used. |
|
Benefits transportation
disadvantaged. |
3 |
Improves transit and
ridesharing. |
|
Improves basic mobility. |
3 |
Improves access by
automobile and other modes. |
Rating from 3 (very
beneficial) to –3 (very harmful). A 0 indicates no impact or mixed impacts.
Toll funding is appropriate for any major bridge or highway improvement (Samuel, 2000), particularly if the improvements primarily benefit higher-income households, so there is little equity justification for subsidies. However, several studies suggest that the potential market for private toll roads is limited (Muller, 2001; GAO, 2004). Congestion pricing and HOT facilities are justified on any roadway that experiences congestion, such as urban highways and major commercial centers.
Table 13 Application Summary - Toll Funded Roads
|
Geographic |
Rating |
Organization |
Rating |
|
Large urban region. |
3 |
Federal government. |
3 |
|
High-density, urban. |
3 |
State/provincial
government. |
3 |
|
Medium-density,
urban/suburban. |
3 |
Regional government. |
3 |
|
Town. |
2 |
Municipal/local government. |
2 |
|
Low-density, rural. |
2 |
Business Associations/TMA. |
1 |
|
Commercial center. |
2 |
Individual business. |
1 |
|
Residential neighborhood. |
1 |
Developer. |
1 |
|
Resort/recreation area. |
2 |
Neighborhood association. |
0 |
|
|
|
Campus. |
0 |
Ratings range from 0 (not
appropriate) to 3 (very appropriate).
Table 14 Application Summary – Congestion Pricing
|
Geographic |
Rating |
Organization |
Rating |
|
Large urban region. |
3 |
Federal government. |
3 |
|
High-density, urban. |
3 |
State/provincial
government. |
3 |
|
Medium-density,
urban/suburban. |
3 |
Regional government. |
3 |
|
Town. |
1 |
Municipal/local government. |
2 |
|
Low-density, rural. |
1 |
Business Associations/TMA. |
1 |
|
Commercial center. |
3 |
Individual business. |
0 |
|
Residential neighborhood. |
1 |
Developer. |
0 |
|
Resort/recreation area. |
2 |
Neighborhood association. |
0 |
|
|
|
Campus. |
0 |
Ratings range from 0 (not
appropriate) to 3 (very appropriate).
Incentive to Reduce Driving
Road Pricing supports most other TDM strategies, including Public Transit Improvements, Rideshare Programs, Parking Management, Parking Solutions, Commute Trip Reduction, Park & Ride and Flextime. It is supported by Institutional Reform, and is a type of Transportation Market Reform. The Pricing Evaluation discusses factors to consider when evaluating Road Pricing options.
Implementation usually requires the leadership of local or regional transportation agencies, plus support from local political officials and user groups. Road Pricing is sometimes implemented by private companies or public-private partnerships that build new highways. Other stakeholders include motorists, professional drivers (truck and taxi drivers), and residents of areas that may be significantly impacted.
A major barrier to Road Pricing is opposition from user groups who consider themselves worse off if they are forced to pay to use roads they currently perceive as free. Consumers generally oppose new or increased prices (Schade and Schlag, 2000). The trucking industry and automobile associations have generally opposed Road Pricing, although this may change as urban congestion increases (Regan, 2000). Many citizens distrust government agencies and fear that Road Pricing will be implemented primarily to increase government revenue, and used inefficiently. Current financing systems, with dedicated funds for highway capacity expansion available as matching grants from other levels of government discourage the use of tolling (Samuel, 2000; Levinson, 2000). In the past, some toll road planners exaggerated demand and potential revenues, resulting in financial failure, which has made toll road financing difficult (Vassallo and Sánchez-Soliño (2007).
Below are recommended best practices for using Road Pricing to achieve TDM objectives. Also see congestion pricing guidelines by Vickrey (1992).
· Choose Pricing
Methods that are cost effective to implement, convenient to users, and
accurately reflect the costs imposed by each trip.
· Use time-variable tolls,
with higher rates during peak periods and lower rates during off-peak periods,
to reduce congestion.
· Apply congestion pricing on
existing roads, not just new facilities.
· Price individual trips.
Avoid significant discounts for frequent users (this contradicts TDM
objectives).
· Encourage development of
travel alternatives, including flextime, ridesharing, transit improvements and
bicycle facilities.
· Integrate pricing with other
TDM strategies that increase traveler choice and provide additional incentives
to use alternative modes in the same area.
· Insure that Road Pricing
decisions are transparent, built on public participation and trust.
· Address equity concerns by
insuring that all groups receive benefits, either through rebates or improved
travel choices.
· Make prices as predictable
as possible.
|
Road Pricing Principles An effective and fair road pricing system should reflect the following principles. User Perspective ·
Easy for users to understand. ·
Convenient – does not require vehicles to stop at toll booths. ·
Transport options – consumers have viable travel options available
(i.e., alternative modes, travel times, routes, destinations). ·
Payment options – easy to use with multiple payment options (cash,
prepaid card, credit card, etc.) ·
Transparent – charges evident before trip is undertaken. ·
Anonymous – privacy of users is assured. Traffic authority Perspective · Traffic impacts – does not require each vehicle to stop at toll booths or in other ways delay traffic. ·
Efficient and equitable – charges reflect true user costs. ·
Effective – reduces traffic congestion and other transportation problems
by changing travel behavior. ·
Flexible – easily accommodates occasional users and different vehicle
types. ·
Reliable – minimal incorrect charges. ·
Secure and enforceable – minimal fraud or non-compliance. ·
Cost effective – positive return on investments. ·
Implementation – minimum disruption during development phase. Can be
expanded as needed. Society’s Perspective · Benefit/cost – positive net benefits (when all impacts are considered). ·
Political acceptability – public perception of fairness and value. ·
Environment – positive environmental impacts. ·
Integrated – same charging system can be used to pay other public
service fees (parking, public transit, etc.) |
Since 17 February 2003 the
city of
Since
1996 a 13-km reversible HOV facility in the median of Interstate15 in
State
Route 91 in
Highway
407, the Express Toll Route (ETR), is a multi-lane, electronic highway running
69 kilometres across the top of the Greater Toronto Area, from Highway 403 in
Mobilizing
the Region #324, Tri-State Transportation Campaign (www.tstc.org)
In
February 2001 the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey changed from
fixed to variable priced tolls (lower tolls during off-peak periods). In June
2001 they released a first-cut analysis of how its new electronic variably
priced toll schedule has affected traffic and transit patterns at the agency’s
Table 15 Port Authority Toll Facilities
|
|
Cash |
|
E-Z Off-Peak |
E-Z Overnight |
|
Cars |
$6 |
$5 |
$4 |
N/A |
|
Carpools |
N/A |
$1 |
$1 |
N/A |
|
Trucks (Per Axle) |
$6 |
$6 |
$5 |
$3.50 |
Although
the off-peak price differences are modest ($1 per trip, a 16-20% discount), the
effects have been significant. Comparing one typical day in May 2001 - less
than 2 months after the variable pricing program went into effect - with a
typical day in May 2000, the Port Authority analysis found that 7% fewer
drivers used the agency’s bridges and tunnels during the morning peak hour
period and that 4% fewer were traveling the crossings during the afternoon peak
hours. These declines amount to 5,150
fewer vehicles in the morning’s most congested hours and 2,500 fewer during the
early evening rush.
Significantly,
the shift of traffic out of the peak hours was accompanied by an increase in
off-peak travel, as well as by increased car-pooling and transit use. The same
May-to-May analysis found that 7% more vehicles (+ 2,150) used Port Authority
facilities between midnight and 6am in 2001, with roughly half of the total
vehicle increase occurring between 5-6am.
The agency also said there were “significant” gains in traffic between
3-4pm and that 3,350 more trips were made during the off-peak hours, 9am-3pm.
Also,
7% fewer trucks (-450) are traveling Port Authority crossings during the
morning peak, while 4% more (+270) are traveling during the overnight hours of
midnight to 6am. The shift out of the afternoon peak hours, at 50 trucks, is
less significant.
Starting
in January, 1998, 2-person carpools have been allowed to use the 3+ HOV lane of
the Katy Freeway (Interstate 10) in
Starting in 3 January 2006
the city of
The program reduced traffic
volumes by about 25%, removing 100,000 vehicles from the roads during peak
business hours and increasing public transit ridership by 40,000 users per day.
About 350,000 vehicles per day pay the fee, generating between 3,500,000 and
21,000,000 kronor (US $500,000 to $2.7 million) in daily revenue, not counting revenue
from the 630 kronor (US $77) fee charged to those who forget to pay the tax. Retail
sales in central
The system uses cameras
positioned along city routes and the drivers are encouraged to outfit their
cars with RFID transponders that interact with stations along the road. Cars
that are not equipped with the device are photographed, matched to a motor
vehicle database, and then billed by the integrated system. All eligible
vehicles entering or leaving the charging zone are charged based on time of
day, with fares highest during peak rush hours, and up to a maximum charge per
day. Payment is made by a number of channels including by direct debit
triggered by the recognition of an electronic tag that is loaned to drivers.
Camera and number plate recognition technologies identify those vehicles
without tags, and are also used to verify tag readings and provide evidence to
support the enforcement of non-payers.
Table 16 summarizes key features
of recent urban road pricing programs.
Table 16 Summary
of Urban Road Pricing (EIU, 2006)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Objective |
Optimise the usage of road infrastructure |
Fund new road and public transport infrastructure projects |
Reduce congestion and fund investments in the |
Reduce congestion, improve the environment and fund increased public transport |
|
Pricing scheme |
€0-2 per inbound trip; variable charge Monday-Friday 7.30-19.00 |
€1.5 per inbound trip; flat rate all days |
€8-10 area charge per day, flat rate Monday- Friday 7.00-18.30 |
€1-2 per in- and outbound trip; variable charge Monday-Friday |
|
Identification method |
98% DSRC |
90% DSRC |
100% ANPR |
50% DSRC 50% ANPR |
|
Payment |
Automatically deducted from pre-pay account |
Most drivers pay via Autopass electronic payment collection system |
Before midnight the day of passage, by SMS or Internet, or in shops |
Within 14 days from the date of passage, in shops or banks or by Internet |
|
Annual Revenue |
€40m |
€150m |
€122m (net) |
€85m |
|
Future |
GPS-based system in consideration, geographical expansion |
Full payment automation, extension and variable pricing scheme considered |
Western extension, DSRC pilot project |
Trial to be extended and revenue used to fund bypass construction |
The
PRIMA (PRIcing Measures Acceptance) is a
European Project focusing on Road Pricing acceptance. It includes research in 8
European cities that are at different stages in Road Pricing development,
including
The
report Pricing European Transport Systems (PETS), funded by the European
Commission, describes several case studies that were modeled, including several
interregional, and two urban traffic management programs to control traffic
congestion, crash risk and pollution emissions.
Key facts:
Benefits:
Key facts:
Benefits:
Key facts:
Benefits:
Key facts:
Benefits:
In August 2001 the German
cabinet has approved plans drawn up by transport minister Kurt Bodewig that
will introduce tolls on trucks using roadways beginning in 2003. Vehicles over
12 tons would be required to pay euros 0.14-0.19 (0.12-0.16
When the MTA,
Pay-as-you-go highways
have become a political nightmare. But backers say that with new approach, the
roads can live up to early hype.
Dan
Weikel,
Political
and financial problems have led many state leaders to conclude that
Today,
the governor says “Freeways should remain free.”
The
Express Lanes created such a political nightmare that the Orange County
Transportation Authority wants to buy the project and put it into the public’s
hands. Three other toll roads in the county are struggling with
lower-than-expected revenue. A fifth proposed tollway in
The
only tollway project untainted by controversy is a proposed segment of
Toll
road advocates concede that the experiment has not gone well. But they say
tollways remain a viable alternative in a state struggling to meet its growing
transportation demands. Federal and state gas taxes, supporters say, will not
provide enough money to pay for billions of dollars in needed highways. And the
state, they note, had to close a $23-billion budget gap this year.
“There
probably isn’t much support for this idea anymore. That is a shame,” said
Irvine City Councilman Mike Ward, who sits on the OCTA board of directors.
“When a mistake is made, the pendulum always swings too far the other way.”
McClintock
and other disaffected politicians should not be so hard on the measures they
helped to make law, Ward said, because they supplied necessary freeways much
faster and cheaper than the state could.
Unlike
the eastern
Three
years later, the Legislature approved four more that would be owned and
financed by private companies--The Mid-State Tollway in
Facing
an acute shortage of transportation funds at the time, legislators said
tollways would take the pressure off snarled freeways and accommodate future
residential and commercial development, particularly in fast-growing
Disenchantment
with the pay-as-you-go highways took root in 1995 when public opposition to the
Mid-State Tollway began to grow. The 40-mile, $600-million route that was to
run through the
In
Default
on Bonds Feared
Meanwhile,
traffic and revenue on the 16-mile San Joaquin Hills toll road has lagged so
badly behind projections that the Transportation Corridor Agencies may default
on $1 billion in bonds by 2012. TCA officials are considering an administrative
merger of the ailing road with the Foothill and the Eastern tollways, two
routes that--so far—are ahead of revenue projections. But there is concern that
dramatic cutbacks in commercial and residential development in
Legislative
opposition to toll roads began to build in 2000 when a little-known agreement between
Caltrans and the owners of the 91 Express Lanes came to light. The clause gave
the owners of the Express Lanes power to block major improvements to the
Riverside Freeway, one of the most congested routes in
The
clause, which was negotiated by Caltrans and never subject to legislative
approval, can prevent improvements along 30 miles of the Riverside Freeway if
they take business away from the Express Lanes. In effect, the state had turned
over control of a portion of a public highway to a private company. Less
restrictive noncompete agreements are in place on the roads operated by the
Transportation Corridor Agencies. They require that the TCA be compensated for
any revenue loss caused by improvements to several public highways, including
stretches of the
After
years of supporting the Express Lanes, the Orange County Transportation
Authority is now trying to buy the tollway for $207.5 million. If the deal is
made, OCTA wants to lift the controversial noncompete clause and make hundreds
of millions of dollars in improvements to the Riverside Freeway.
“The
whole concept of noncompete clauses has put a stranglehold on the state’s
ability to make improvements to highways,” said
Future
Backing Unlikely
Largely
because of noncompete clauses, members of the Assembly and Senate
Transportation Committees say it is unlikely the Legislature will support more
toll roads. State Sen. Kevin Murray (
In
campaigning for reelection, Gov. Gray Davis has said he is against toll roads,
especially those privately owned. His opponent, Bill Simon Jr., favors the
for-profit operations. Even less restrictive agreements like the TCA’s are in
question. McClintock said he would “strenuously object” to toll road deals that
would interfere with construction on state highways.
Support
for toll roads has eroded so much in the Capitol that OCTA officials say they
are having a hard time getting support for a bill that would help complete the
authority’s purchase of the 91 Express Lanes. OCTA, which wants to maintain the
toll lanes for awhile, needs state approval to charge tolls.
Toll
road advocates agree that noncompete clauses are a weakness in the effort to
build more toll roads in
As
the debate continues, a private venture is moving ahead with
Daily
Texan, Dec
02, 2002 (www.dailytexanonline.com)
UT
civil engineering professor and a group of graduate students are trying to
solve
Kockelman
has devised a plan to limit the amount of travelers during peak hours - weekday
mornings from 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., and evenings from 4:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.
on major highways in
The
plan is based on credit-based congestion pricing, a system that regulates the
amount of passage on a road by encouraging people not to drive. Every driver
would be granted a trip budget for each month, which would account for a certain
number of trips on the congested stretch of highway. For any excessive trip,
the traveler would be charged a fee, and those not reaching their trip limit
would collect money for staying off the highways. Drivers staying off the roads
during traditional rush hours would pocket cash for their consideration,
Kockelman said. “Congestion is the number one issue if you ask people locally,”
Kockelman said. “We’re going to make a dent in it hopefully.”
Kockelman
and a group of graduate students in the civil engineering department are
surveying people around the city to get answers to some of their questions. The
group wants to know the number of necessary passages most travelers need in a
given week to get a sense of how the plan could fall into place.
Sukumar
Kalmanje, a graduate student heading up the survey, said about 300 people have
been polled so far. “We really want a lot of people to fill out the survey,
because the whole idea of doing the survey is finding out who needs to make the
most trips,” Kalmanje said. “The surveys that have come back have shown that
people are open to this, and it is definitely something that people will be
talking about in the coming years.” Kalmanje said a report could be completed
in the next six months, and the group is hopeful about giving its input to city
officials. “We would love to present something to the city,” he said.
Kockelman
said travelers overuse the roads. Charging drivers for unnecessary trips or
trips out of their budget would make travel more valuable and therefore
encourage drivers to make fewer unnecessary trips.
The Puget Sound Traffic Choices Study is a federally funded
pilot that will test the effects of road pricing on traffic congestion, and as
a transportation funding strategy. Representative drivers from throughout the
region will participate in the year-long study. Five-hundred vehicles from over
300 households will be outfitted with an in-vehicle (taxi-like) metering
device. The Traffic Choices Meter identifies vehicle location and displays the
cost to use a requested road at the time it is approached. The results will
represent the value placed on road access by a random sample of diverse
participants using key roads throughout the
A World Bank study came to the following conclusions about the prospects of privately finnanced toll roads:
The demand for road services will continue to grow
and hence so will the need for investment. Worldwide, the stock of motor
vehicles is growing at nearly three percent per year. Since the number of
vehicle kilometers traveled tends to grow somewhat faster than the stock of
motor vehicles, this implies that at least for some segments of the road
network, the demand prospects are quite good. The fast urbanization of the
developing world adds another dimension that cannot be ignored and explains the
strong demand for urban access roads in many of the most populated countries of
the world.
The challenge here is to bet on the right horses. Demand will increase but only on some segments of the network and it is tempting for a government to oversell a specific road based on aggregatetraffic growth prospects. Even holding the effects of toll levels constant, traffic volumes are very sensitive to income and economic growth. The failure to recognize this may be one of the main reasons why so many toll road projects have failed or ended in bitter renegotiations. Motorization and vehicle-kilometers traveled tend to increase faster than income levels. This high income elasticity, especially for leisure trips, makes toll roads especially sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. For roads that serve export activities, exchange rate changes can dramatically affect trade, leading to major changes in demand patterns.
Many toll road projects in the last decade have
dramatically overestimated traffic levels. In some of the Mexican road
concessions, traffic volumes were only one-fifth of the forecasted levels. In
Four hundred Puget Sound-area residents are participating in a study to determine how variable tolls would change driving habits. The study is being conducted by the Puget Sound Regional Council. It began July 1, 2005 and will continue through March 2006. Each participant is given $1,016 in a debit account. A meter similar to those used in taxis was installed in their car and, with the help of global positioning satellites that keep track of where and when they drive, it subtracts a toll that varies depending on the time of day and the route.
For instance, if
participants drive on Interstate 405 on a weekday between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m. –
peak commuting hours – a computer subtracts 50 cents a mile from their account.
If they make the same trip using city streets after 7 p.m. the computer
subtracts only 5 cents a mile. That means the 17-mile trip to the
The Dutch government is
phasing out the current vehicle tax (Motorrijtuigenbelasting or MRB) and
vehicle sales tax (Belasting Personenauto’s en Motoren or BPM) and replacing
them with a per-kilometre fee to finance roadway infrastructure. Motorists who
drive less will pay less, and those who drive more will pay more. Cars that
pollute more will be more expensive than cleaner cars. Total government
revenues will not increase. This is considered fairer and more efficient than
the current system, which imposes very high vehicle ownership taxes. The
program is therefore deliberately named “a
Eventually, each vehicle will
be fitted with a mobimeter that will
record the number of kilometres driven and the charge payable (www.minvenw.nl/cend/dco/home/data/international/gb/eng1201.html).
An open standard will be used, so the private sector can play an important role
and incorporate ancillary services such as travel information, automatic
breakdown notification and payment for parking. A public/private platform is to
be set up in order to develop such services.
A study by the Washington
State Department of Transportation compared various potential congestion
reduction strategies in its major urban areas, including highway capacity
expansion, transit service improvements, High Occupant Vehicle priority lanes,
and congestion pricing. The analysis found that the benefits of the other
strategies increase if implemented with congestion pricing.
The
Traffic Choices Study is a federally funded pilot that tested new ways to
combat traffic congestion and fund transportation. Through the study, our
region has developed a better understanding of the policy and technical issues
associated with road pricing, and the results will inform updates to the
region's plans and influence decisions about our future.
How the study worked
Representative
drivers from throughout the
The results
The
primary aims of the Traffic Choices Study were to (1) accurately describe the
behavioral response to the congestion-based tolling of roadways, (2) better
understand issues of policy related to the implementation of road tolling, and
(3) test an integrated system of technical solutions to the problem of tolling
a large network of roads without installing substantial physical hardware on
the roadside. The study has met these goals and has begun to widely distribute
the findings from the research. It is our hope that project results will inform
discussions about how to manage congestion and fund transportation improvements
in the future.
CUPID is a evaluation of
urban road pricing, based on studies and experience from several European
cities. This study will help in drawing up recommendations to support the
implementation of future road pricing schemes, based around a set of 15
questions covering both scheme definition issues, such as ‘How much
should be charged?’ and ‘Who should be charged?’ and
implementation process issues such as ‘How can opposition be overcome?’ and
‘What can be learnt from previous attempts to introduce road pricing?’ Results
are published in the CUPID newsletter (www.transport-pricing.net/download/cupidnews6.pdf).
National
Post May
30, 2000, by
The
road lobby’s answer? Build new roads, rebuild old ones, do it on the double and
keep roads free -- the same road map that brought us to the dead end we’re at.
Free roads don’t provide the economic signals needed to determine what roads
are needed and when; they allow politicians to build pet roads devoid of
economic rationale. If we tolled our roads, instead of funding them through
gasoline taxes, property taxes and general government revenues, we’d have fewer
but better-maintained roads, we’d have fewer two-car families and we’d tend to
drive our one car far more economically.
The
Canadian Automobile Association sees things differently. It treats automobile
mobility as a right and claims congestion is caused by too few roads, not by
too many cars freeloading on free roads. The CAA wants to boost spending on
road construction and maintenance dramatically. A 1998 federal study pegged the
cost of upgrading the national highway infrastructure at $17-billion. The CAA,
if it costed out its requests to expand the full road system, might be asking
for $170-billion.
The
CAA has company in demanding that governments rev up the concrete mixers and
lay more asphalt. That’s also the demand of the Canadian Trucking Alliance, the
Canadian Portland Cement Association, engineers, organized labour and other
groups, many of them organized by the Canadian Construction Association into a
lobby group called the Coalition to Renew
You’d
expect environmental groups, social activists and anti-car lobbies to promote
measures that raise the costs of highways. But opposition to the highway
lobby’s free ride also comes from the libertarian Cato Institute, a
Washington-based organization that strongly promotes the free enterprise system
and holds no distaste for the private automobile. In an exhaustive scholarly
work by Robert L. Bradley entitled Oil, Gas, and Government, Cato documents the
U.S. road lobby’s relentless role in seeing to the overbuilding of the U.S.
highway system. Fifty years ago, organizations such as the American Automobile
Association, trucking associations, the Asphalt Institute, the American
Concrete Paving Association and the Big Three automakers banded together to
promote “scientifically based, tax-free road building.” Their massive lobbying
campaign in the 1950s swayed Congress to fund the largest public works program
in
Free
roads had high costs. “With full Road Pricing, transportation would have
shifted to mass transit and other modes such as trains and airplanes. With
fewer vehicles, particularly passenger cars, less lead, carbon monoxide and
ozone-producing hydrocarbon pollution would have occurred. This would have
improved air quality, particularly in major urban areas ... With greater
transportation economies, motor-fuel prices could also have been lower for
vehicle owners and for consumers across the energy spectrum,” concludes Mr.
Bradley.
The
free road movement in the
Toll
roads are now back – many are on the drawing boards in
|
The
police officer sees a car weaving back and forth down the highway and he
takes off after it and pulls up alongside and the driver is a little old lady
and she’s knitting as she drives. He can’t believe it and he yells at her,
“Pull over! Pull over!” and she says, “No, it’s a scarf!” |
Applied Location (www.appliedlocation.com) is a company that specializes in developing technologies for applying location-based vehicle pricing.
Thomas Adler, Willard Ristau & Stacey Falzarano (1999), “Traveler Reactions to Congestion Pricing Concepts for New York’s Tappan Zee Bridge,” Transportation Research Record 1659, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org), pp. 87-97.
Apogee (1994), Costs and Cost Effectiveness of Transportation Control Measures; A Review and Analysis of the Literature, National Association of Regional Councils (www.narc.org).
Robert Bain and Michael Wilkins (2002), Credit Implications of Traffic Risk in Start-Up Toll Facilities, Standard & Poors Infrastructure Finance (www.people.hbs.edu/besty/projfinportal).
Robert Bain and Michael Wilkins (2002), Credit Implications of
Traffic Risk in Start-Up Toll Facilities: Appendix--Traffic Risk Index,
Report Appendix, Standard & Poors Infrastructure Finance
Bridge Tolls (www.bridgetolls.org)
is an Internet site promoting dialogue concerning the implementation of tolls
on
Kenneth J. Button
and Erik T. Verhoef (1998), “Road
Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the Environment: Issues of Efficiency and
Social Feasibility,” Edward Elgar
Publishing.
CCAP (2005), Transportation Emissions Guidebook:
Land Use, Transit & Transportation Demand Management,
CESifo (2005), “City Toll” (various articles on roadway congestion pricing) Dice Report: Journal of Institutional Comparisons, Vol. 3, No. 3 (www.cesifo-group.de/DICE).
CFIT (2002), Paying for Road Use, Commission for Integrated Transport (www.cfit.gov.uk/reports/pfru/index.htm).
CFIT (2006), World Review of Road Pricing – Phase 2, Commission for Integrated Transport (www.cfit.gov.uk); available at www.cfit.gov.uk/docs/2006/wrrp/wrrp2/index.htm.
CODOT, Value
Express Lanes Feasibility Study (www.valuelanes.com).
Describes proposed HOT lanes in the
Tina Collier and Ginger Goodin (2004), Managed Lanes: A Cross-Cutting Study, Operations Office of Transportation Management, Federal Highway Administration (http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freewaymgmt/managed_lanes/index.htm).
Congestion Pricing Bibliography, (www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/slp/conpric/bib.htm).
Patrick DeCorla-Souza (2000), Making Value Pricing on Currently Free Lanes Acceptable to the Public with “FAIR” Lanes, ITS Quarterly, Spring 2000. Also see Patrick DeCorla-Souza (1995), “Applying the Cashing Out Approach to Congestion Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 1450 (www.trb.org), pp. 34-37.
Patrick DeCorla-Souza (2006), “FAST Miles: Benefits and Financial Feasibility of Multimodal Investment and Pricing Strategy,” Transportation Research Record 1960, TRB (www.trb.org), pp. 152-158.
DfT, Road Pricing Website (www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_roads/documents/divisionhomepage/032120.hcsp),
UK Department for Transport. Various documents related to road pricing
implementation in the
ECMT (2004), Managing Transport Demand through User Charges: Experience to Date, European Conference of Ministers of Transport and OECD (www1.oecd.org/cem/topics/env/London04.htm).
ED (2007), Congestion Pricing; A Solution For Reducing Traffic In Urban Centers And Busy Corridors, Environmental Defense (www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?contentID=6288)
EIU (2006), Driving Change: How Policymakers Are Using Road Charging To Tackle Congestion, Economist Intelligence Unit (http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/eiu_ibm_traffic_wp.pdf)
Antonio Estache,
Manuel Romero and John Strong (2000), The Long and Winding Path To Private
Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads, Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute,
World Bank - Policy Research Working Paper 2387 (http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/24000/24500/24500/1142.pdf).
ETTM (Electronic Toll Collection and Traffic Management) (www.ettm.com) website provides information on vehicle tolling technology and applications, including a comprehensive summary of major North America toll roads and bridges (www.ettm.com/usafac.html).
European Program for Mobility Management (www.epommweb.org) provides resources for transportation demand management planning and program development.
European Transport Pricing Initiatives (www.transport-pricing.ne) includes various efforts to develop more fair and efficient pricing. Specific European transportation pricing projects are described below:
AFFORD (www.vatt.fi/afford) is an evaluation of optimal transportation pricing policies.
CORDIS Project - Transport (www.cordis.lu/cost-transport/src/cost-342.htm) is a major European study of best practice in pricing and land use management policies to improve mobility and address energy and emission problems.
CUPID (Co-ordinating Urban Pricing Integrated Demonstrations), European Transport Pricing Initiative, Project No. GRD1-1999-10958, European Commission, Competitive and Sustainable Growth Programme (www.transport-pricing.net/reports22.html).
ExternE (http://externe.jrc.es) involves research into external costs of transport.
Generalization of Research on Accounts and Cost Estimates (www.grace-eu.org) is a research program
developing methods of calculating marginal costs of road and rail transport and
apply them to transport pricing reform in
IMPRINT: Implementing Pricing Reform in Transport (www.imprint-eu.org) and IMPRINT-NET (www.imprint-net.org) are efforts to promote implementation of fair and efficient transport pricing.
PETS (www.cordis.lu/transport/src/pets.htm) assesses current pricing of transport modes in European Union member countries.
REVENUE: Revenue Use from Transport Pricing (www.revenue-eu.org) assesses current practice of transport revenue use and develops guidelines for good use of the revenues from social marginal cost based pricing.
SPRUCTRUM (www.its.leeds.ac.uk/projects/spectrum) (Study of Policies regarding Economic instruments Complementing Transport Regulation and the Undertaking of physical Measures) is a research program to develop a framework for evaluating economic instruments, regulatory and physical measures to help achieve transport efficiency and equity objectives.
TRACE (www.hcg.nl/projects/trace/trace1.htm) provides costs of private road travel and their effects on demand, including short and long term elasticities. Sponsored by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Transport.
TRENEN (www.cordis.lu/transport/src/trenen.htm) is an effort to develop models for transport, environment and energy.
UNITE (www.its.leeds.ac.uk/projects/unite) involves transport cost accounting.
Oscar Faber (2000), Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport - The Role of Charges and Taxes, European Commission DG TREN in association with EC DG TAXUD and EC DG ENV. Available through the European Program for Mobility Management (www.epommweb.org).
FHWA Road Pricing Website (www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov) provides information on road pricing and tolling programs by the U.S. Federal Highway Administration.
FHWA (1997), Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study, USDOT (www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/summary/index.htm).
FHWA (2006), Congestion Pricing: A Primer, Office of Transportation Management, Federal Highway Admimistration (www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov); available at www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/congestionpricing.pdf.
GAO
(2003), Reducing
Congestion: Congestion Pricing Has Promise for Improving Use of Transportation
Infrastructure, General
Accounting Office, GAO-03-735T, a statement for the record to the Joint
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (www.gao.gov/highlights/d03735thigh.pdf),
May 6, 2003.
GAO (2004), Highways and Transit: Private Sector Sponsorship Of And Investment In Major Projects Has Been Limited, General Accounting Office, GAO-04-419 (www.gao.gov).
Genevieve Giuliano (1994), “Equity and Fairness Considerations of Congestion Pricing,” Curbing Gridlock, Vol. 2, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org).
Stephen Glaister
and Dan Graham (2003), Transport Pricing and Investment In England,
Imperial Collage London and
Independent Transport Commission (www.cts.cv.imperial.ac.uk).
Ginger Goodin (2005), “Managed Lanes: The Future of Freeway Travel,” ITE Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, Institute of Transportation Engineers (www.ite.org), February 2005, pp. 22-26.
Phil Goodwin (1997), Solving Congestion, Inaugural lecture for the Professorship of Transport Policy, University College London (www.ucl.ac.uk/transport-studies/tsu/pbginau.htm).
Tony Grayling, Nathan Sansom and Julie Foley (2004), In the Fast Lane: Fair and Effective Road User Charging in Britain, Institute for Public Policy Research (www.ippr.org.uk/press/files/InthefastlaneJuly04.pdf).
Greig Harvey (1994), “Transportation Pricing and Travel Behavior,” Curbing Gridlock, Vol. 2, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org).
Greig Harvey and Elizabeth Deakin (1997), “The STEP Analysis Package: Description and Application Examples,” Appendix B, in Apogee Research, Guidance on the Use of Market Mechanisms to Reduce Transportation Emissions, USEPA (www.epa.gov/omswww/market.htm).
Tim Hau (1992), Economic Fundamentals of Road Pricing, Report Nos. TWU 1 and TWU 2, Infrastructure and Urban development, World Bank (www.worldbank.org); available at www.econ.hku.hk/~timhau/download.html.
HHH Institute of Public Affairs (1996), Buying Time; Guidebook for Those Considering Congestion Relief Tolls in Their Communities, Value Pricing Website, HHH Institute of Public Affairs, (www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/slp/projects/conpric).
Jose Holguin-Veras, Mecit Cetin and Shuwan Xia (2006), “A Comparative Analysis of US Toll Policy,” Transportation Research A, Vol. 40, No. 10 (www.elsevier.com/locate/tra), pp. 852-871.
Innovative Finance for Surface Transportation (www.innovativefinance.org) is an Internet based clearinghouse providing information on innovations in road pricing and user fees.
Elizabeth E. Isler, Lester
A. Hoel, Michael D. Fontaine (2005), Innovative Parking
Management Strategies For Universities: Accommodating Multiple Objectives In A
Constrained Environment, Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting (www.trb.org).
John Kain (1994), “Impacts of Congestion Pricing on Transit and Carpool Demand and Supply,” Curbing Gridlock, Vol. 2, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org).
Sukumar Kalmanje and Kara M. Kockelman (2004), Credit-Based Congestion Pricing: Travel,
Land Value, & Welfare Impacts, Presented at the Transportation Research
Board Annual Meeting (www.trb.org),
David A. King, Michael Manville and Donald Shoup (2007), “The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing,” Transport Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/PoliticalCalculus.pdf), March 2007, pp. 111-123. Also see David A. King, Michael Manville and Donald Shoup (2007), “For Whom The Road Tolls,” Access, Number 31, University of California Transportation Center (www.uctc.net).
Kara M. Kockelman and Sukumar Kalmanje (2004), Credit-Based Congestion Pricing: A Proposed Policy and the Public’s Response (www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/kockelman/public_html/TR-A-CBCP.pdf).
Charles Komanoff (2003), A Value Pricing Plan for the MTA: Saving Drivers Time While Generating Revenue, Tri-State Transportation Campaign (www.tstc.org/MTApricing.pdf).
Charles Komanoff and Brian Ketchem (2003), The Hours:
Time Savings from Tolling The East River Bridges, Bridge Tolls Advocacy
Project (www.bridgetolls.org).
Jonathan Levine and Yaakov Garb (2000), Evaluating the Promise and Hazards of Congestion Pricing Proposals; An Access Centered Approach, Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies (www.fips.org.il).
David Levinson (1998), “Case Study: Road Pricing in Practice,” in Kenneth J. Button and Erik T. Verhoef (eds.) Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the Environment: Issues in Efficiency and Social Feasibility, Edward Elgar Publishing; available at www.ce.umn.edu/~levinson/Abstracts6.html.
David M.
Levinson (2000),
“Revenue Choice on Serial Networks,” Journal of Transport Economics &
Policy, Vol. 34, Part 1, January 2000, pp. 69-78.
David Levinson (2002), Financing Transportation Networks, Edward Elgar (www.e-elgar.com), ISBN: 1840645946.
David Levinson and Andrew Odlyzko (2007), Too Expensive to Meter: The Influence of Transaction Costs in Transportation and Communication, University of Minnesota Digital Technology Center (www.dtc.umn.edu); available at www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/metering-expensive.pdf.
Robin Lindsey (2006), “Do Economists Reach A Conclusion on Road Pricing? The Intellectual History of an Idea,” Econ Journal Watch: Scholarly Comments on Academic Economics, Volume 3, Number 2 (www.econjournalwatch.org/pdf/EJWCompleteIssueMay2006.pdf), May 2006, pp 292-379.
Robin Lindsey
(2007), Congestion Relief: Assessing The Case For Road Tolls In Canada, Commentary 248, C.D. Howe Institute (www.cdhowe.org).
Todd Litman (1996), “Using Road Pricing Revenue: Economic Efficiency and Equity Considerations,” Transportation Research Record 1558, TRB (www.trb.org), pp. 24-28; available at www.vtpi.org/revenue.pdf.
Todd Litman (2001), What’s It Worth? Life Cycle and Benefit/Cost Analysis for Evaluating Economic Value, Presented at Internet Symposium on Benefit-Cost Analysis, Transportation Association of Canada (www.tac-atc.ca), available at www.vtpi.org/worth.pdf.
Todd Litman
(2007), Socially Optimal
Transport Prices and Markets, VTPI (www.vtpi.org);
at www.vtpi.org/sotpm.pdf.
Todd Litman (2003), London Congestion Pricing: Implications for Other Cities, Victoria Transport Policy Institute (www.vtpi.org); available at www.vtpi.org/london.pdf.
Todd Litman and Felix Laube (1999), Automobile Dependency and Economic Development, VTPI (www.vtpi.org).
London Congestion Charging Website (www.cclondon.com).
Managed Lanes Initiative (http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freewaymgmt/managed_lanes/index.htm), sponsored by the U.S. Federal Highway Administration, provides information on various strategies for managing highway lanes to improve their performance.
A.D. May and D.S. Milne (2000), “Effects of
Ali Mekky (1999), “Forecasting Toll Revenues for Fully Electronic Highways Operating Under Transponder and Video-Imaging Systems,” Transportation Research Record 1659, TRB (www.trb.org), pp. 11-22.
MeTrO Congestion Charge Website (http://metro.pbsjis.com), is an information
sharing network among major cities implementing congestion pricing.
Gerhard Metschies (2001), Adam Smith and the Principles of a Sustainable Road Policy: An Analysis Of The 12 Principles Of Road Policy, Based On An Enquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations By Adam Smith, First Published 1776, for Historical Roots of the Road Management Initiative (RMI), the International Road Federation and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ (http://zietlow.com/docs/adamsmith.pdf). This paper discusses how some of Adam Smith’s ideas apply to road pricing. Although some of the issues and examples are outdated, many of the basic insights are still relevant.
MTPW (1999), Results of the Rekeningrijden Technology Subproject 1999 System test and System Design, Ministry of Transport and Public Works, The Netherlands (www.minvenw.nl/dgp/rr/english/index.html).
Robert H. Muller (2001), Tollroad Feasibility Studies; An Historical Perspective, Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, (www.trb.org).
James Murphy and Mark Delucchi (1998), “A Review of the Literature on the Social Cost of Motor Vehicle Use in the United States,” Journal of Transportation And Statistics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (www.bts.gov), January 1998, pp. 15-42.
Margaret
O’Mahony, Dermot Geraghty and Ivor Humphreys (2000), “Distance and Time
Based Road Pricing Trial in
PETS (2000), Pricing European Transport Systems; Final Report, Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds, European Transport Pricing Initiative (www.Transport-Pricing.Net), funded by the European Commission, Dec.
Andrew T.W. Pickford and Philip T. Blythe (2006), Road User Charging and Electronic Toll Collection, Artech House (www.artechhouse.com).
Robert Poole and Kenneth Orski (2001), Hot Networks: A New Plan For Congestion Relief And Better Transit, Paper 305, Reason Foundation, (www.rppi.org/ps305.pdf).
Richard H. Pratt (1999-2007), Traveler Response to Transportation System Changes, TCRP Report 95, TRB (www.trb.org); at www.trb.org/TRBNet/ProjectDisplay.asp?ProjectID=1034.
PRIMA (www.certu.fr/internat/peuro/prima/prima.htm)
is a European Project focusing on Road Pricing acceptance (PRIMA stands for
PRIcing Measures Acceptance).
PROGRESS (www.progress-project.org) was a European Union program to demonstrate and evaluate the effectiveness and acceptance of integrated urban transport pricing schemes to achieve transport goals and raise revenue.
PSRC
(2005), Travel Choices
Study, Puget Sound Regional Council (www.psrc.org/projects/trafficchoices).
This federally funded pilot project tests the effects of pricing on
residents travel behavior.
Fiona Rajé (2003), Impacts Of Road User
Charging/Workplace Parking Levy On Social Inclusion/Exclusion: Gender,
Ethnicity And Lifecycle Issues,
Giorgio Ragazzi
(2006), “Are Highways Best Run By Concessions? The Italian Experience,” World Transport Policy & Practice,
Vol. 12, No. 2 (http://www.ecoplan.org/wtpp/wtj_index.htm),
Spring 2006, pp. 22-34.
Amelia Regan (2000), “What Can A Trucker Do?” ACCESS, No 17 (www.uctc.net), Fall, 2000, pp. 20-25.
Martin G. Richards (2006), Congestion Charging in London: The Policy And The Politics, Palgrave (www.palgrave.com/products/Catalogue.aspx?is=1403932409).
Harry W. Richardson, editor (2008), Road
Congestion Pricing In Europe: Implications for the United
States, Edger Elgar
(www.e-elgar-environment.com/Bookentry_contents.lasso?id=12789).
Road User Charging and Work Place Parking Levy Online
Database (www.geocities.com/transport_and_society/roadusercharging.html),
is maintained by researchers at various
Road Charging Update (www.roadcharging.com) provides information one the businesses of road pricing, congestion charging and e-tolling.
Road User Fee Task Force (www.odot.state.or.us/ruftf) produced various reports on the advantages and disadvantages of various road user fees as an alternative to fuel taxes to fund state roads.
Gabriel Roth (1996), Roads in a Market Economy, Avebury Technical (
Peter Samuel (2000), Putting Customers in the Driver’s Seat: The Case for Tolls, Reason Public Policy Institute (www.rppi.org).
Georgina
Jens Schade and Bernhard Schlag (2000), Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing, Government Institute for Economic Research (Helsinki), Traffic and Transportation Psychology, Dresden University (www.verkehrspsychologie-dresden.de).
Jan A.Schwaab and Sascha Thielmann (2001), Economic Instruments for Sustainable Road Transport: An Overview for Policy Makers in Developing Countries, GTZ (www.gtz.de) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (www.unescap.org), available at www.gtz.de/dokumente/Economic_Instruments_for_Sustainable_Road_Transport.pdf.
D. Shefer and P. Rietvald (1997), “Congestion and Safety on Highways: Towards an Analytical Model,” Urban Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1997, pp. 679-692.
Kenneth A. Small (2005), “Road Pricing and Public Transit,” ACCESS 26, University of California Transportation Center (www.uctc.net), Spring 2005, pp. 10-15.
Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, The Adam Smith Institute (www.adamsmith.org.uk).
William Stockton and Ginger Daniels (2000), Considerations in Assessing the Feasibility of High-Occupancy Toll Lanes, Texas Transportation Institute (http://tti.tamu.edu/documents/7-4915-S.pdf).
Edward Sullivan (1998), Evaluating the Impacts of the SR 91 Variable-Toll Express Lane Facility, Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cal Poly State University (http://ceenve.calpoly.edu/sullivan/SR91).
T&E (2000), Counting the Kilometres - And Paying for Them; How to Introduce an EU Wide Kilometre Charging System, European Federation for Transport and Environment (www.t-e.nu).
TRB (2006), The Fuel Tax and Alternatives for Transportation Funding, Special Report 285, Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org).
TCRP (2003), Road Value Pricing: Traveler Response to Transport System Changes, Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 95; Transportation Research Board (www.trb.org); available at (http://trb.org/publications/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_95c14.pdf).
Toll Roads (www.tcagencies.com) is the website for
Transportation Corridor Agencies, which manages toll lanes on highways in
Toll Roads News (www.tollroadsnews.com) a monthly newsletter on turnpikes, tolling and road price issues.
Transportation Alternatives Congestion Pricing Webpage
(www.transalt.org/campaigns/sensible/congestion.html)
provides information on congestion pricing, with particular emphasis on
implementation in
TRB Congestion Pricing Committee (www.trb-pricing.org) provides information on road pricing research by the Transportation Research Board, including papers, conference planning and Committee activities.
TRUCE (Tool for Rush-hour User Charge Evaluation) is a spreadsheet developed by the FHWA, to help estimate the potential the costs, benefits and revenues from highway congestion pricing; at http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/tolling_pricing/value_pricing/tools/index.htm.
Barry Ubbels and Erik Verhoef (2006), “Behavioural Responses To Road Pricing Empirical Results From A Survey Among Dutch Car Owners,” Transportation Research Record 1960, TRB (www.trb.org), pp. 159-166; available at www.mdt.mt.gov/research/docs/trb_cd/Files/06-1095.pdf.
USEPA (1998), Congestion Pricing, Transportation and Air Quality TCM Technical Overviews, US Environmental Protection Agency (www.epa.gov/oms/transp/publicat/pub_tech.htm).
José M. Vassallo and Antonio
Sánchez-Soliño (2007), “Subordinated Public Participation Loans for Financing
Toll Highway Concessions in
Value Pricing Homepage (www.valuepricing.org)
at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute for Public Policy, provides information on
Value Pricing (Congestion Pricing) principles, resources and projects.
William Vickrey (1992), Principles of Efficient
Congestion Pricing,
William Vickrey (1994), Public Economics; Selected Papers by William Vickrey, Cambridge University Press (www.uk.cambridge.org).
Jose M. Viegas (2001), “Making Urban Road Pricing Acceptable and Effective: Searching for Quality and Equity in Urban Mobility,” Transport Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4, (www.elsevier.com/locate/tranpol), Oct. 2001, pp. 289-294.
Martin Wachs (2003), Improving Efficiency and Equity in Transportation Finance, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, Brookings Institute (www.brookings.edu/es/urban).
Kevin Washbrook (2002), Lower Mainland Commuter
Preference Survey, School of Resource and Environmental Management,
WSDOT (2001), Managed Lanes Feasibility Study, Washington State Department of Transportation, (www.wsdot.wa.gov/mobility/managed).
WSDOT (2006), Congestion Relief Analysis: For the Central
Puget Sound,
This
Encyclopedia is produced by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute to help
improve understanding of Transportation Demand Management. It is an ongoing
project. Please send us your comments and suggestions for improvement.
Victoria Transport Policy Institute
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Phone & Fax 250-360-1560
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